극단적인 비관론자인 Nouriel Roubini가 미국 의회에 제출한 보고서중의 일부입니다.
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Nouriel Roubini’s Global EconoMonitor
1. The Housing recession takes 30 percent off of home prices. As a renter, I might be cheered by this if it weren’t going to potentially?destroy the economy as we know it. As house prices were running up and friends were sheepishly admitting to how they doubled their net worth, I had the vague sense of panic that I was missing out, but I also felt like this was a phantom wealth. My friends with houses seemed to like the security of it, but fortunately for them, they didn’t try to convert it into real-world wealth through home-equity lines of credit. People who got greedy or jumped into the house-buying game late after getting caught up in the hoopla are the ones who are going to find themselves with negative equity.
2. Which is Roubini’s second point. Mortgages across the house buying spectrum were suspect, in part because they were all affected and inflated by the unmoored house prices. Credit problems are now spreading to near prime and prime mortgages as the same reckless lending practices in subprime (no down-payment, no verification of income, jobs and assets (i.e. NINJA or LIAR loans), interest rate only, negative amortization, teaser rates, etc.) were occurring across the entire spectrum of mortgages; about 60% of all mortgage origination since 2005 through 2007 had these reckless and toxic features.
With falling prices, a huge percentage of the homes sold in those years could go underwater, and those are precisely the borrowers who are ill-equipped to cope with the setback. This is true of virtually all financial panics. The last in are usually hurt first, and hurt the worst. It’s easily justified by painting such investors as greedy, as overwhelmed by envy of the profits others were making. But really, for home buyers drawn into the market by their life circumstances (and ideology about the sanctity of homeownership?how it makes you an adult and somehow legitimizes your family) and not their investment whims, it was just unfortunate timing. An unhappy consequence of treating renters like second-class citizens.
3. Credit problems begin to afflict credit-card loans. This will create a feedback loop, with bank losses tightening credit, tight credit causing consumers to pull back, balking consumers worsening the recession, and the recession compounding credit problems.
4. Monoline insurers?the firms that back debt issuance and allow municipal and corporate creditors to represent themselves as less?risky?start to fail, casting doubt on all those improved bond ratings they helped facilitate. This roils all the different institutional?investors that hold the bonds, and makes them impossible to value because no one wants to buy them and thereby put a price to them. Panic begins to afflict the managers of these funds, as they can no longer tell what their asset holdings are actually worth, or how well they themselves are performing.
5. Commercial real estate begins to meltdown the same way that the residential market has. The associated securities and the banks and?investors involved with them all suffer.6. The combined weight of all these problems causes a regional bank to fail, prompting the specter of bank runs and forcing the Fed to?commit to bailouts.
7. Banks’ balance sheets take a hit from ill-conceived leveraged buyouts from the credit bubble era?these loans were often overleveraged?and undercollateralized, leaving banks more exposed to potential losses if the business involved fail?and we are in a recession after all.
8. Corporate defaults will begin to mount. Fear of counterparty risk will loom large, deepening the credit freeze.
Corporate default rates will surge during the 2008 recession and peak well above 10% based on recent studies. And once defaults are higher and credit spreads higher massive losses will occur among the credit default swaps (CDS) that provided protection against corporate defaults. Estimates of the losses on a notional value of $50 trillion CDS against a bond base of $5 trillion are varied (from $20 billion to $250 billion with a number closer to the latter figure more likely). Losses on CDS do not represent only a transfer of wealth from those who sold protection to those who bought it. If losses are large some of the counterparties who sold protection ? possibly large institutions such as monolines, some hedge funds or a large broker dealer ? may go bankrupt leading to even greater systemic risk as those who bought protection may face counterparties who cannot pay.
9. Then the “shadow banking system” will collapse. the “shadow banking system” (as defined by the PIMCO folks) or more?precisely the “shadow financial system” (as it is composed by non-bank financial institutions) will soon get into serious trouble. This shadow financial system is composed of financial institutions that ? like banks ? borrow short and in liquid forms and lend or invest long in more illiquid assets. This system includes: SIVs, conduits, money market funds, monolines, investment banks, hedge funds and other non-bank financial institutions. All these institutions are subject to market risk, credit risk (given their risky investments) and especially liquidity/rollover risk as their short term liquid liabilities can be rolled off easily while their assets are more long term and illiquid. Unlike banks these non-bank financial institutions don’t have direct or indirect access to the central bank’s lender of last resort support as they are not depository institutions. Thus, in the case of financial distress and/or illiquidity they may go bankrupt because of both insolvency and/or lack of liquidity and inability to roll over or refinance their short term liabilities.
10. The stock market tanks; the S&P 500 loses a quarter of its value.
11. Credit spreads?a measure of risk?widen, which not only makes the Fed’s policy tool of cutting rates ineffective but also spurs a?widespread liquidity crisis?in other words, people can’t get their money.
12. The liquidity problems force assets to sell at an unwarranted discount, given the assets’ underlying value. This becomes a downward?spiral for all sorts of investments.
A near global economic recession will ensue as the financial and credit losses and the credit crunch spread around the world. Panic, fire?sales, cascading fall in asset prices will exacerbate the financial and real economic distress as a number of large and systemically important financial institutions go bankrupt. A 1987 style stock market crash could occur leading to further panic and severe financial and economic distress. Monetary and fiscal easing will not be able to prevent a systemic financial meltdown as credit and insolvency problems trump illiquidity problems. The lack of trust in counterparties ? driven by the opacity and lack of transparency in financial markets, and uncertainty about the size of the losses and who is holding the toxic waste securities ? will add to the impotence of monetary policy and lead to massive hoarding of liquidity that will exacerbates the liquidity and credit crunch.
This is what Roubini calls the meltdown scenario.
1. 루비니 교수는 미국 역사상 최악의 주택 침체를 ‘출발점’으로 잡았다. 그는 주택 가격이 고점 대비 20~30% 하락, 가구 소득 4~6조 달러가 증발해 약 1000만 가구가 담보물(주택)의 가치 하락 탓에 채무자로 전락할 것으로 전망했다. 그들은 결국 더 못사는 동네로 이사가고 파산하는 주택업체들도 덩달아 급증할 것으로 그는 예상했다.
2. 월가는 현재 서브프라임 모기지 관련 손실을 2500~3000억 달러로 추산하고 있다. 골드만삭스 추정치는 4000억 달러 정도다. 루비니 교수는 서브프라임 손실이 확대될 수밖에 없다고 판단했다. 그는 “2005~2007년 시장에 공급된 모기지 가운데 60%가 무모하거나 부적절하다”며 “주택 가격이 20% 이상 떨어지면 손실은 늘어날 수밖에 없다”고 주장했다. 이어 “은행들의 신용도 떨어지기 마련”이라고 그는 덧붙였다.
3. 신용카드, 자동차 할부, 학자금 대출 등의 무보증 민간 부채로 인한 대규모 손실이 다음 단계로 제시됐다. 모기지에서 시작된 신용경색은 민간 부문 등 신용시장 전 분야로 확산될 것으로 그는 전망했다.
4. 다음 희생양은 채권보증업체들의 등급 하향. 루비니 교수는 “AAA 등급이 어울리지 않는 채권보증업체들의 등급이 하향될 것이고, 이로 인해 1500억 달러 상당의 자산담보부증권(ABS)이 추가로 상각될 것”이라고 내다봤다.
5·6. 곧이어 상업 부동산 시장이 붕괴하고 대형 지역 은행이나 국영 은행이 파산할 것으로 루비니 교수는 예상했다.
7. 그는 또 무모한 차입매수(LBO)로 인한 손실이 부각돼 수천억 달러의 LBO 자금이 금융기관을 압박할 것이라고 진단했다.
8. 다음은 기업들의 채무 불이행이다. 루비니 교수는 “평균적으로 볼 때 미국 기업들의 재정 상태는 견조하지만 수익성이 낮고 부채가 많은 기업들도 꽤 많다”며 그 결과 이들 채권의 신용부도스왑(CDS) 손실이 커져 2500억 달러 정도가 사라질 것으로 전망했다.
9. ‘그림자 금융’ 시스템의 붕괴. 그는 “헤지펀드, 구조화투자회사(SIVs)를 시장이 다루기가 더 어려워 질 것”이라며 “이들은 중앙은행에서 직접 돈을 조달할 길이 없다”고 지적했다.
10·11. 그는 “헤지펀드, 마진콜 등이 계속 실패하면 증시는 폭락장을 연출할 수 있다”며 “이 때문에 금융 시장에서 유동성이 사라져 은행간 또는 자금 시장에서 지불능력에 관한 우려가 고조될 것”이라고 분석했다.
